It’s a little conspicuous not to mention one of, if not the, most common defenses of limitless torture: its dissuasive effect on other people, for which there is no obvious upper limit. If it has to be deployed apparently it isn't enough.
> There is no benefit to torturing the evil beyond what it takes to prevent them from doing further evil. If you are a utilitarian, there is no utility gain. If you are a deontologist, it surely violates whatever moral law you subscribe to.
What if my moral framework is antifascism? Then extermination of fascists is good in and of itself.
So, I basically agree with the conclusions you draw, and I think this is very well-argued and reasonable a position to hold. Nevertheless, I have some concerns about some of the points made, which are relatively minor, in my opinion.
First one is, to me, a confusion between the claim that "some views reflect radical evil" (I will use the term radical evil in following the post-Kantian tradition here, because of the connotations of the term ontological) with the claim that "views that are morally blameworthy as constitutive of radical evil rob agents of moral powers". In fact, I think the confusion here between these two claims is odd, because the fact of the possibility of the exercise of radical evil itself seems reliant on the possibility of the free exercises of our moral capacities, which is what ensures that evil acts or character-traits are morally blameworthy in the first place. The question of our attitudes towards morally blameworthy people is an interesting discussion, but I believe different from the question about the existence of radical evil. I imagine I would lean in your direction in these questions.
I think a potential counter-point to this is the nebulous nature of the term 'radical evil'. But in Kant's original formulation of the term, it is exactly an ethical attitude that can burst open in any of us as an ontological property of human reason, insofar as hypothetical imperatives undergirding self-interest have an independent power of their own. It is hard to argue that Nazism's ideological set-up in any way or form conforms to any notion of respect for human dignity or the minimal moral law demanded by the CI, so any agent absorbed into Nazi ideology would surely possess a world-view which was constituted by radical evil. Indeed, the notions of such things as preservation of race-interest appear to be classic cases of the dominion of narrow self-interest over ethical universality.
Secondly, I am unsure about the moral phenomenology you undertake in when you say it harms the self-imagined just. Surely there are two distinct moods of enjoyment that show themselves when dealing with cases of radical evil, that of enjoyment born from righteous anger and a mood of enjoyment borne from pleasure in torture. The former one appears to me at least potentially ethically justifiable, and an attitude that would reinforce the will's conformance to the demands of duty, insofar as the sentiment of repugnance generated by one's experience of another's radical evil can be an educational experience that sets one's own virtue (and here again I talk of virtue as possessing the capacity to overcome temptation against duty, which in the end would compel an agent to overcome reliance on such educational patterns in the first place) in line. Obviously, the secondary category, which I find is how most of the celebrations were framed, is morally unjustifiable.
Your essay suggests that those who impliedly believe in ontological evil need to be eradicated or stripped of power and rights, lest they do likewise first. I don't see a way out of it — someone's values must triumph.
Only the destruction of universal values can triumph, we must realize the fact that we are not inherently morally good or bad, only the result of a personal history that shapes us and can still change
Philosophy has evolved from being in response to others’ newspaper articles and letters to being in response to twitter debates!
Dialectical progress?
Truly
It’s a little conspicuous not to mention one of, if not the, most common defenses of limitless torture: its dissuasive effect on other people, for which there is no obvious upper limit. If it has to be deployed apparently it isn't enough.
Interesting topic. Nice fluid writing style
> There is no benefit to torturing the evil beyond what it takes to prevent them from doing further evil. If you are a utilitarian, there is no utility gain. If you are a deontologist, it surely violates whatever moral law you subscribe to.
What if my moral framework is antifascism? Then extermination of fascists is good in and of itself.
So, I basically agree with the conclusions you draw, and I think this is very well-argued and reasonable a position to hold. Nevertheless, I have some concerns about some of the points made, which are relatively minor, in my opinion.
First one is, to me, a confusion between the claim that "some views reflect radical evil" (I will use the term radical evil in following the post-Kantian tradition here, because of the connotations of the term ontological) with the claim that "views that are morally blameworthy as constitutive of radical evil rob agents of moral powers". In fact, I think the confusion here between these two claims is odd, because the fact of the possibility of the exercise of radical evil itself seems reliant on the possibility of the free exercises of our moral capacities, which is what ensures that evil acts or character-traits are morally blameworthy in the first place. The question of our attitudes towards morally blameworthy people is an interesting discussion, but I believe different from the question about the existence of radical evil. I imagine I would lean in your direction in these questions.
I think a potential counter-point to this is the nebulous nature of the term 'radical evil'. But in Kant's original formulation of the term, it is exactly an ethical attitude that can burst open in any of us as an ontological property of human reason, insofar as hypothetical imperatives undergirding self-interest have an independent power of their own. It is hard to argue that Nazism's ideological set-up in any way or form conforms to any notion of respect for human dignity or the minimal moral law demanded by the CI, so any agent absorbed into Nazi ideology would surely possess a world-view which was constituted by radical evil. Indeed, the notions of such things as preservation of race-interest appear to be classic cases of the dominion of narrow self-interest over ethical universality.
Secondly, I am unsure about the moral phenomenology you undertake in when you say it harms the self-imagined just. Surely there are two distinct moods of enjoyment that show themselves when dealing with cases of radical evil, that of enjoyment born from righteous anger and a mood of enjoyment borne from pleasure in torture. The former one appears to me at least potentially ethically justifiable, and an attitude that would reinforce the will's conformance to the demands of duty, insofar as the sentiment of repugnance generated by one's experience of another's radical evil can be an educational experience that sets one's own virtue (and here again I talk of virtue as possessing the capacity to overcome temptation against duty, which in the end would compel an agent to overcome reliance on such educational patterns in the first place) in line. Obviously, the secondary category, which I find is how most of the celebrations were framed, is morally unjustifiable.
Your essay suggests that those who impliedly believe in ontological evil need to be eradicated or stripped of power and rights, lest they do likewise first. I don't see a way out of it — someone's values must triumph.
Only the destruction of universal values can triumph, we must realize the fact that we are not inherently morally good or bad, only the result of a personal history that shapes us and can still change